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Abstract 
Theory attributes finance with the ability to both promote growth and reduce output volatility, 
and therefore increase energy security. But evidence is mixed, partly due to endogeneity effects. 
For example, financial institutions themselves might be a source of volatility, as the events of 
2008 suggest. We address this endogeneity issue by using periods of extreme oil price volatility 
as a source of nearly exogenous volatility, to study the effect of finance. To do this, we develop 
a quasi-natural experiment and study the effect of the dramatic decline of oil prices in 2014, 
using a synthetic control methodology. Our hypothesis is that the ability of oil-rich countries to 
mitigate the effects of this decline rested on the quality of their financial institutions. We focus 
on 11 oil-rich countries between 1980 and 2014 that had “poor” measures of financial 
development (treatment group) out of 20 such countries and synthetically create counterfactuals 
from the remaining (control) group with “superior” financial development. We subject both to 
the oil price shock of 2014 and find evidence that better financial institutions do indeed reduce 
output volatility and mitigate its negative effect on growth in the year that showed a sustained 
decline in oil price. To address any remaining potential endogeneity between oil prices and 
finance, we also use a cross-sectionally augmented autoregressive distributed lag model with 
data on 30 oil-producing countries over the period 1980-2016, and confirm that the effects of oil 
volatility on growth is mitigated with better financial institutions. Our results make a strong case 
for the support of the positive role of financial development in improving energy security and 
fostering growth. 
 
JEL Classifications: C23, F43, G20, O13, O40, Q43. 
Keywords: Oil price volatility; Energy security; Resource curse; Financial Institutions; Synthetic 
control; Economic growth. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
Theoretically, institutions of finance are supposed to promote economic growth via better capital allocation, 
the monitoring and influencing of firms’ governance, the pooling of savings, and the promotion of 
specialization (Levine 1997, 2004). Theoretical considerations also extend to the contribution of finance to 
volatility reduction via its ability to allow agents to diversify risk. For example, Acemoglu and Zilibotti 
(1997) argue that better diversification enables a gradual allocation of funds to their most productive use, 
with more productive specialization reducing the variability of growth.  
But the evidence on whether finance is growth promoting or volatility reducing are mixed.  For 
example, while Levine (1997, 2004) shows that finance is growth promoting, Cecchetti and Kharroubi 
(2012) illustrate the advantages of finance in promoting growth exist only up to a certain point beyond 
which, they become a drag. Evidence on volatility reducing aspects of finance are equally mixed.  For 
example, Braun and Larrain (2005) and Raddatz (2006) find that financial development reduces output 
volatility, while Easterly et al. (2000) find a U-shaped relationship between volatility and financial sector 
depth. Denizer et al. (2002) generally supports a negative correlation between financial depth and growth, 
consumption, and investment volatility, but Acemoglu, et al. (2003) and Beck et al. (2006) find that such a 
relation is not robust.  A more recent paper by Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013) finds results regarding the 
volatility effects of finance that echo those found by Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) on the growth effects 
of finance: i.e., financial depth plays a significant role in dampening the volatility of output, consumption, 
and investment growth, but only up to a certain point. At very high levels, such as those observed in many 
advanced economies, financial depth amplifies consumption and investment volatility. 
Most of the studies above are subject to some endogeneity issues that make establishing causality 
difficult. Consider the financial collapse of 2008 as an example. It is suggested that finance was actually 
the source of the crisis and its associated volatility. However, if finance also helped to ameliorate further 
subsequent volatility effects that might have occurred, for example by allowing for greater risk 
diversification, then causal relation will not be easy to establish.  But if we can find an exogenous source 
of volatility that is independent of finance, then we can examine causality.   
We find a nearly exogenous source of volatility in oil prices as they heavily impacted oil producing 
countries.  We qualify our source of volatility as “nearly exogenous” because there has been some debate 
in the literature on the relation between oil and finance. For example, Wen et al. (2012) examine the time-
varying relationship between West Texas Intermediate (WTI) prices, S&P 500 returns, and the Chinese 
stock market indices and find that the dependence between oil shocks and stock markets increases after the 
2008 global financial crisis. On the other hand, Fattouh et al. (2013) find no evidence that in general, 
speculation and financialization of the oil market have driven oil spot prices after 2003, while Irwin and 
Sanders (2012) show that passive index investment caused a massive bubble in commodity futures prices.  
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Zhang (2017) using a VAR approach, finds “some causality” from Brent prices to stock market (about 
23%). Of course, having a stock market react to oil prices or vice versa is different from actual financial 
development which is the interest of this paper. On this point Ji and Zhang (2018) provides some suggestive 
evidence that oil price shocks may have driven the development of oil future market in China.  
As it appears from the above discussion, the issue is less about the exogeneity of oil prices as it is 
about the exogeneity of financial and stock market variables. However, where some authors find support 
for the effect of finance on oil prices (e.g, Wen, et. al. 2002 and Irwin and Sanders, 2012) their focus is on 
short-term price volatilities, rather than on long-term oil price effects.  In fact, an extensive study by 
Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016), using a compact quarterly model of the global economy, formally tests 
whether oil prices can be treated as weakly exogenous in the country-specific oil supply equations, and 
finds that they cannot reject this hypothesis for all of the major oil producers, including Saudi Arabia and 
the United States (see also Cashin et al., 2014).  
As for the dependence of financial markets on oil prices, our measure is not one of stock market 
performance which are subject to endogeneity discussions above. Rather, we focus on measures that 
provide long-term institutional support for finance, i.e. “degree of centralization or government control” 
where the degree of flexibility reflected in a privately controlled financial system is a proxy (or instrument) 
for the degree of financial depth. This way we limit the extent of short-run change in financial measures 
due to spikes in oil prices decreasing that level of correlation between oil prices and financial depth. 
Nonetheless, to address any remaining potential endogeneity issues and to see if our findings from our first 
test, which is a quasi-natural experiment based on the synthetic control method (see below) holds up against 
any endogeneity issues, we also use a cross-sectionally augmented autoregressive distributed lag (CS-
ARDL) approach, which is well known for its ability to address any endogeneity, to test our results and 
find them consistent. 
With our chosen financial depth measure, we then ask what the effect of oil price volatility was on 
both the growth and the volatility of output among oil producers and whether financial institutions 
moderated the nature of the impact.   This matters not only to oil producers but possibly for global energy 
security: if better financial management were to moderate the impact of oil price volatility, this could reduce 
reliance on the quantity adjustments by oil producers (e.g., OPEC or OPEC+ more recently) to stabilize 
their revenue stream, implying a more reliable flow of oil and improved energy security for all. 
Given the focus on oil producers, the oil price collapse that started from the third quarter of 2014 
and that plays a key role in the first part of our paper, is a “negative” volatility whose impact could not have 
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been beneficial to oil producers.1 Because we use oil prices as our exogenous source of variation and study 
their effect on oil producing economies, our paper is also related to the oil curse literature, or more broadly, 
to the natural resource curse literature. Thus, we briefly review the relevant aspects of this literature. First, 
we note that the prevailing view of the natural resource curse, i.e., the alleged adverse effect of natural 
resource wealth on income or growth, has been challenged by those that show such an effect depends on 
the quality of the underlying institutions (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 
2006; Boschini et al., 2007) as well as those who shed doubt on the existence of the curse itself (Alexeev 
and Conrad, 2009; Arezki et al., 2017; Cavalcanti et al. 2011; Esfahani et al., 2014; Smith, 2015).2   
Second, we note that in light of these challenges, a new strand of research has emerged that focuses 
on the volatility of resource wealth, instead. For example, Leong and Mohaddes (2011) and El-Anshasy et 
al. (2015) have shown that resource rent volatility negatively affects economic growth.3 But here again, the 
intermediating role of institutions arises. Using the Fraser chain-linked index of institutional quality, Leong 
and Mohaddes (2011) find that the negative effect of resource volatility on growth is moderated with higher 
quality institutions.  By virtue of its focus on financial institutions, this paper is therefore also related to this 
last group of studies and is a further refinement of such studies. But because finance plays a particularly 
direct role in relation to volatility related issues, our focus on financial institutions is a more natural 
extension of the above studies.   
We carry out our analysis in two ways depending on what we mean by oil price volatility. In the 
first approach, we view volatility as the dramatic drop that oil prices experienced starting from the third 
quarter of 2014. This allows us to consider this particular event as a quasi-natural experiment. Dividing oil 
producing countries into those with good financial institutions (control) and those with poor financial 
institutions (treatment) we study the effect of differences in financial depth across oil rich countries on their 
ability to deal with this dramatic oil price decline by synthetically constructing our counterfactuals for each 
treated country using the synthetic control technique originally pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003). The advantage of this approach over the prevailing difference-in-difference methodology or its 
propensity score matching refinement is that the synthetic control approach overcomes the challenge of the 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Mohaddes and Raissi (2018) who make this point clear for macro aggregates (such as equity prices, 
GDP, and inflation) and not only for oil producing, but also of countries with high dependence on major oil producers 
(such as non-oil producing Middle East and North Africa countries). 
2 For example, Alexeev and Conrad (2009) show that natural resources appear (falsely) to reduce growth rates because 
they boost base incomes and thus controlling for this effect, uncovers an underlying positive role of natural resources 
in economic growth.  Arezki et al. (2017) use an exogenous instrument from the giant oil field discoveries dataset, to 
show that in the long-run oil boosts income. Similar conclusions are reached by Smith (2015). Cavalcanti et al. (2011), 
using the real value of oil production, rent or reserves as a proxy for resource endowment, illustrate that oil abundance 
has a positive effect on both income levels and economic growth. While they accept that oil rich countries could 
benefit more from their natural wealth by adopting growth and welfare enhancing policies and institutions, they 
challenge the common view that oil abundance affects economic growth negatively. 
3 See also Mohaddes and Pesaran (2014). 
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selection of an appropriate control group. Such a group may or may not exist even in the absence of 
sampling errors, due to inherent uncertainties in the choice of a suitable control country (Abadie et al., 
2010). The synthetic control method constructs a counterfactual that better aligns with the treated country 
along a variety of factors, reducing the pretreatment differences between the control and treated country. 
In the second approach, our measure of oil price volatility is not event-based, but rather, based on 
the annual standard deviation of monthly oil prices over the period 1980 to 2016. For this we rely on data 
for 30 major oil producers and a regression approach using the cross-sectionally augmented autoregressive 
distributive lag (CS-ARDL) methodology (Cavalcanti et al., 2015, Chudik and Pesaran, 2015, and Chudik 
et al. 2016) using the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator (Pesaran et. al., 1999). 
In what follows, Section 2 presents the synthetic control methodology, estimation procedure, and 
data, while Section 3 discusses the results from this counterfactual synthetic exercise. In Section 4 we re-
examine our findings by using the cross-sectionally augmented autoregressive distributed lag (CS-ARDL) 
model to address any remaining endogeneity concerns. We also use this opportunity to extend the scope of 
our analysis to include more countries over a longer period. Section 5 provides an in depth discussion of 
the implications of our findings in terms of energy security and finally, section 6 provides concluding 
remarks and policy implications.  
 
2. The Synthetic Control Method: Methodology, Estimation Procedure and Data 
The synthetic control method is a counterfactual approach pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) 
hence forth known as AG. This is a variation of the difference-in-difference approach, but instead of a 
control group, determined by pre-intervention propensity matching, a synthetic control is constructed using 
a weighted average of potential controls to obtain the “best fit” that would closely match the treated unit’s 
pretreatment variables. AG use this methodology to study how terrorist activities in the Basque region of 
Spain post 1960, reduced GDP per capita as compared to a synthetic control composed of other similar 
regions that were unaffected by the terrorism. An important modification of this methodology is a paper by 
Singhal and Nilakantan (2016) who study the effect, on economic performance, of counterinsurgency 
policies in India by comparing the performance of one specific region, Andhra Pradesh, which developed 
a specialty task force to combat the Naxalite insurgency, with a synthetic control of other similar states 
which did not have such a specialty task force. In Singhal and Nilakantan (2016), all states in India were 
impacted by the Naxalite insurgency but only Andhra Pradesh developed the task force to fight the 
insurgency. This contrasts with the approach by AG in which the treatment (terrorism) affected one region 
but not all.  
Our method is more in line with Singhal and Nilakantan (2016) in that fluctuations in the world oil 
price affect all oil producing countries (analogous to terrorism in India), but the differences in the resulting 
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volatility and growth across countries arises due to their differing levels of financial development. To 
estimate possible mitigating impact of financial depth in this framework, the treated (control) countries are 
oil producers with “low” (“high”) levels of financial development.4 From this we construct a synthetic 
counterfactual (or control) for each treated country, where both the treated country and its counterfactual 
are similar in relevant aspects and especially in their dependence on oil (measured by oil to GDP ratios) but 
differ in their financial depth. A comparison of the predicted “outcome” in the synthetic control with the 
observed outcome in the treated country will tell us whether or not financial depth mitigates the effects of 
oil price volatility. The primary outcome variables chosen are output and growth as well as output and 
growth volatility, as these are the traditional performance metrics, and are the variables also involved in 
testing the natural resource curse hypothesis. We expect output and growth volatility to be lower and growth 
and output to be higher in the synthetic controls when compared to their treated counterparts suggesting a 
positive contribution of financial depth. To test this econometrically, the differences in these measures 
between the treated country and their synthetic control counterpart are regressed on a dummy variable that 
represents pre- and post-oil decline with significant results of its coefficients telling a more encompassing 
story that helps us generalize findings across all treated countries.5 
2.1 Constructing the Synthetic Control Country 
Consider a given set of control and treatment groups. Let 𝑾 = (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑗) be a (𝐽 × 1 ) vector of non-
negative weights, where 𝑤𝑗 is the weight applied to control country j in the resulting synthetic control 
corresponding to a given treatment country (if 𝑤𝑗 = 0, there is no influence of country j on the synthetic 
control). Naturally, different vectors of W will generate different synthetic controls. The optimal W is 
obtained by minimizing the expression, 
(𝑿𝟏 − 𝑿𝟎𝑾)′𝑽(𝑿𝟏 − 𝑿𝟎𝑾)    (1) 
subject to 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 and 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑗 = 1 , where 𝑿𝟏 is a (𝐾 × 1 ) vector of pretreatment 
GDP predictors for the treated country; 𝑿𝟎 is a (𝐾 × 𝐽 ) matrix of the same K pretreatment GDP 
predictors for the J possible control countries, V is a diagonal matrix of non-negative components 
reflecting the importance of different GDP predictors. AG suggests that the optimal choice of V is one 
where the resulting synthetic control best matches the pretreatment GDP level of the treated country.6  
                                                          
4 The split between “low” and “high” financial development is described in Section 2.2. 
5 See later for expectations and implications of the signs and significance of these coefficients 
6 To find the optimal vector W*, V is initially assumed to be an identity matrix and an initial W’ is calculated. This 
W’ yields the best match to the treated country’s GDP measure without taking into account the degree of importance 
of each of the predictors. Using this initial W’, the optimal V matrix is then calculated identifying the degree of 
importance placed on each predictor. Finally, V is used to calculate the final optimal weight W*. W* takes the 
importance of the GDP predictors into account and provides a good fit to the treated country’s pre-treatment GDP.  
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The optimal weight vector W* is applied to the GDP of the control countries to obtain the resulting 
synthetic control. i.e. if we define 𝒀𝟏 as a (𝑇 × 1 ) vector of output levels for the treated country and 𝒀𝟎 as 
a (𝑇 × 𝐽 ) matrix of output levels for the control countries, the synthetic control for the treated country will 
be the (𝑇 × 1) vector Y1*, such that 
                                                                                     𝒀𝟏
∗ = 𝒀𝟎𝑾
∗                                                                              (𝟐) 
Given that the weights are derived from the pretreatment period, the differences between the treated 
country 𝒀𝟏, and its synthetic control 𝒀𝟏
∗ , should be most prominent in the post treatment period as a result of 
change in the nature of the relationship between output and its predictors due to the treatment (i.e. if the 
treatment proves relevant).  Thus, the difference between Y1 and Y
*
1 in the post treatment period   are 
attributed to the treatment. The degree of fit of the pretreatment variable of interest (in our case GDP) is 
what AG refers to as the root mean square prediction error (RMSPE). This is simply the sum of squares of 
the difference between the resulting synthetic control measures of GDP and the treated country’s GDP in 
the pretreatment period7.  
 
2.2 Estimation Procedure and Sample Selection  
As a step towards the goal of this paper we exploit the recent decline in oil prices in the third quarter of 
2014 as a source of exogenous variation. As can be seen from Figure 1, the 2014 decline in the last nine 
years is second only to the fallout from the 2008 financial crisis (and not by much). Unlike the 2008 decline 
in which finance was the trigger for the crisis and subsequent reaction of the financial institutions that led 
to the mitigation of the crisis (Jarrett and Mohtadi, 2017), the 2014 decline has been attributed to a 
technology shock (shale oil extraction in the United States) and in this case, plausibly exogenous to financial 
depth.8 The technological advancements over the last decade have not only reduced the costs associated 
with the production of unconventional oil, but also made extraction of oil resemble a manufacturing process 
in which one can adjust production in response to price changes with relative ease. Therefore, one of the 
implications of the shale oil revolution is that U.S. production can play a significant role in balancing global 
demand and supply, and this in turn implies that the current low oil price environment could be persistent 
(see Mohaddes and Raissi, 2018). Moreover, a recent study has also found that output elasticity of 
unconventional new wells to price changes is 3-4 times conventional wells. This combination produces a 
                                                          
7 It should be noted that the synthetic control method does capture the effect of the 2008 financial crisis in the 
pretreatment period. This is so since all controls used to create the synthetic control also experienced the same shock 
and thus so did their resulting synthetic controls which are just the weighted averages of the original controls.  
8 A clear example of this reaction by the financial institutions during the great recession is the increase in bank reserves 
as well as the reduction in lending activities. No such reaction was observed during the 2014 decline in oil prices 
making it exogenous to financial depth. 
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floor for the oil prices that may be hard to escape (see, for instance, Bjørnland et al., 2016 and Mohaddes 
and Pesaran, 2017).  
 
Figure 1: Monthly Oil Prices 
 
Source: https://www.nasdaq.com/markets/crude-oil-brent.aspx 
To determine the potential mitigating effect of financial depth on countries that suffer a significant 
deterioration of performance due to the drop in the price of oil, two factors need to be considered: first, 
paying particular attention to oil rich/dependent countries as this would be the group most impacted by the 
shock; and the second, sorting the oil rich group into ones with “superior” financial depth and ones without. 
To accomplish these two goals, we first select countries in the 80th percentile in annual oil value to GDP 
ratio.9 These countries comprise both our control and treatment groups. Next, we choose a performance 
variable. Since all countries are equally exposed to the variations in the oil price, we must find a variable 
that transmits oil price volatility into country level effects to capture cross-country variations while also 
reflecting oil price volatility. The most commonly impacted variable is naturally the output level, making 
GDP an appropriate performance variable to use. The output predictors used to create the synthetic controls 
by forming the weights that comprise vector “v” I equation 1 include oil-to-GDP ratio, population, capital 
stock, initial level of output, imports, exports, trade-to-GDP ratios, capital restrictions (measured by the 
Chinn-Ito, 2006 index) and sovereign wealth funds, specifically, the value of the sovereign wealth fund 
each country possessed at the beginning of the oil price decline.10 Finally, we divide the selected countries 
into two groups; those above-median levels of financial development (Group A), and those below-median 
                                                          
9 Oil to GDP ratio is from Oil and Gas data (Ross, 2013), available at http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlross. 
10 The ability of countries to draw on their sovereign wealth funds in order to dampen the negative effects of 
commodity price volatility is well documented in Mohaddes and Raissi (2017). 
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(Group B).11 This cutoff was chosen with the number of countries in mind. If the cut-off is too high or too 
low, we would either no longer have enough countries in the control group with which to form appropriate 
synthetic controls or enough of the treated countries with which to make more general statements. Group 
A countries constitute the potential set for constructing the synthetic controls for each country in group B 
(the treated group).12 
With these considerations, we have 26 countries with average oil to GDP ratio from 8.9% to 59%, 
and financial measure split between 16 treated countries in group B and 10 potential control countries in 
group A. From the selection of treated countries, we drop Egypt, Yemen and Venezuela because their 
political and social instability in the post-treatment period, would certainly generate higher levels of output 
volatility that cannot be disentangled from volatility as a result of oil price fluctuation and as such, inclusion 
of these countries will contaminate our results if left in our sample. We also drop Saudi Arabia given its 
singular ability to adjust extraction policies to influence changes in oil price which would potentially 
introduce treatment bias.  
  In order to highlight the effect of financial depth, measures of financial depth themselves must be 
omitted from the set of output predictor variables that are used in the synthetic control construction since 
by design synthetic controls have higher levels of financial development than the treated country.   
It is important to note that apart from our proposed indirect effect of financial depth on output 
through oil price volatility mitigation, there is also the well documented direct effect of financial 
development on output (see, for instance, Levine, 1997). This implies that we do not expect the pretreatment 
output levels to be a close match and should differ with varying degrees, depending on how much dispersion 
there is between financial development measures of the synthetic control and the treated country.  Rather, 
than an obstacle to our analysis, we take advantage of this unique property by developing placebo tests in 
the following way: we make the erroneous assumption that countries in the control group with high financial 
development measures (Group A) have poor finances. We then create synthetic controls for each country 
in group A (one at a time) using the remaining control countries. First, we expect the output levels of both 
the synthetic control and the “treated” country in the placebo tests to better align due to resulting similar 
                                                          
11 The median used for this separation is the median of the average of all financial subset measures in the Fraser chain 
linked index that measures institutional quality, see section 2.3. The list of countries in each group is provided in Table 
10 in the Appendix. 
12 To further emphasize the effect of financial depth, different cutoffs of financial depth were employed. Countries 
were split into two groups; one group above the 70th percentile level of financial development (Group A), and the 
second, having below the 40th percentile level of financial development (Group B) resulting in a sample of 15 countries 
with 9 treated countries in group B and 6 potential control countries in group A. There was some evidence in support 
of financial depth alleviating the negative effects of oil price volatility, but the results were mixed. The issue with this 
approach is the limitation in the number of potential control countries such that adequate synthetic controls may not 
be possible to construct. This limitation is also the reason why the fits obtained in the main analysis are not as accurate 
as some others in the literature, where what they study allows them to have more countries in their control “bucket”. 
The results for this analysis are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request.  
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financial measures, i.e. we expect the synthetic controls of our placebo tests to have lower average RMSPE 
when compared with the average RMSPE of the treated countries. This will add an extra layer to our 
analysis and to the literature on the finance-growth nexus by showing the degree of importance of financial 
depth in determining levels of output when these placebo tests are carried out. Secondly, we would expect 
to see similar fluctuations in output in the pre and post treatment period for both the synthetic control and 
“treated” country in the placebo tests again as a result of similar financial depth measures. This will serve 
as verification that results picked up by the main test are valid.  
We also rule out Chad from the main analysis due to a comparable lack of pretreatment fit of its 
synthetic control. While we allow some leeway for the pretreatment fit due to the absence of the financial 
depth measure in creating the synthetic control, the RMSPE for Chad is 3.5 standard deviations away from 
the mean of all countries in the treated group which average a RMSPE of 0.29. AG suggests that countries 
for whom adequate synthetic controls cannot be obtained (very high RMSPE) are outside the convex hull 
of the potential control countries. To intuit, this would otherwise amount to creating a synthetic control for 
the United States from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. We therefore have 12 countries left in the treatment 
group. Finally, Nigeria is removed from the initial analysis as the country rebased its GDP in 2013 just 
prior the treatment period under study, thus altering its measure of dependence on oil in the pre and post 
treatment periods. However, we draw on this particular example to make a separate point in Section 3.2 
that ties well with our results while simultaneously providing valuable information about the natural 
resource curse literature. 
2.3 Data 
We use quarterly data (between 2006Q1 and 2016Q4), as this allows for more observations especially 
needed for the post-2014 period given that we only have three annual observations post 2014. Quarterly 
data is also very useful as it allows us to calculate annual volatility. For a majority of the countries with 
poor financial measures, quarterly observations on key variables are not reported and as a result, these 
variables need to be estimated. For the period chosen, quarterly data on imports and exports are the only 
data points available for all countries in our analysis. We therefore use these variables to generate quarterly 
output levels. To do so, we first obtain annual measures of import to GDP ratio, and then use the quarterly 
imports data to generate quarterly output measures for each country.  Our assumption is that quarterly ratios 
remain roughly constant over the quarters within that year. We use this as our primary estimate of quarterly 
GDP given the relationship between imports and GDP and the well-established literature on marginal 
propensity to import resulting from changes in GDP (see, for instance, Chang, 1946, Shinohara, 1957 and 
Golub, 1983).  
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To further validate this as a viable measure, we obtain actual seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP 
data from 44 countries as well as their corresponding measures of quarterly imports and annual import to 
GDP ratios. We calculate GDP estimates based on the proposed system above and compare the estimates 
to the actual quarterly GDP measures. There is an overall correlation coefficient of 0.92, suggesting a 
significant relationship between the actual and our estimated output data. We also faced similar data 
restrictions with respect to the predictor variables. To overcome these limitations, we made similar 
assumptions that the variables remained constant across all quarters for each year, which is not unreasonable 
as we do not expect significant changes in capital stock and capital restrictions between each quarter of a 
particular year. 
 As a measure of financial depth, we turn to the financial components of the Fraser chain linked 
index of cross-country institutional quality. As a result, our measure of domestic financial depth is the 
average of the following sub-components of the Fraser chain index defined as follows:   
i. ownership of banks (oob) which measures the percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned 
banks and countries with a higher percentage of these deposits receive a higher “oob” rating;  
ii. private sector credit (psc) which measures government borrowing relative to private borrowing 
with higher government borrowing ratios receiving a lower rating. The assumption here is that 
greater government borrowing implies more central planning; and  
iii. interest rate controls (irc) uses data on credit market controls.  Countries where interest rates are 
determined by the markets, countries with stable monetary policy and reasonable real deposit and 
lending rate spreads receive higher ratings (Gwartney et. al. 2015).  
 In general, these measures capture the degree of private financial freedom, assigning higher 
ratings to countries with greater financial freedom (giving them the ability to facilitate growth in their 
financial infrastructure) and lower ratings to countries with greater government or central control which 
financial market participants and researchers alike have suggested hampers financial growth. This measure 
differs from the more traditional indices of financial depth that measure observable outcomes (e.g, stock 
market indices, actual measures of private sector deposits and private sector lending) but instead capture a 
measure of the structural framework of the financial sector; its behavior and practices that tend to be stable 
over time. Therefore, we can make the claim that these countries do not necessarily become decentralized 
due to oil discoveries keeping our financial measures relatively stable in the pre and post treatment period. 
This implies that these measures are much less subject to endogeneity as a result of the findings of Beck 
and Poelhekke (2017) and Zhang (2018) that suggest that oil price shocks can in turn influence the financial 
depth level since these financial indices are not as affected. 
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3. Results and Interpretation 
Table 1 shows the optimal weights assigned to each potential control country. To highlight the effectiveness 
of the matching process (with the preference slanted towards matching output levels), Table 2 shows the 
averages of the predictor variables for all treated countries and their corresponding counterfactual synthetic 
controls. The differences between the synthetic control and the treated group appear small, suggesting that 
the counterfactual and the treated countries are indeed similar at least with respect to these specific 
measures.13 However, given that oil volatility is an ongoing phenomenon, the oil price decline of post-2014 
period is not unique but one in the history of oil price volatility in the post-World War two period. As such, 
our approach does not contain a classic pre-treatment period in which control and treatment countries 
exhibit identical behavior. Rather, our control and treatment group differ by their financial depth and as 
such, the analysis we undertake below highlights the consequence of this difference for output by examining 
the relationship between the treated and control before and after the significant drop in oil prices.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
To provide a clearer picture and a conclusion that compares the performance of countries with high 
financial depth to those with low financial depth, the following regressions are run 
 
                 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖,𝑡                                      (3) 
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖,𝑡                                           (4) 
                                                          𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀3𝑖,𝑡                                               (5) 
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼4 + 𝛽4𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀4𝑖,𝑡                                              (6) 
 
Where ratio_output (ratio_growth) is the ratio of annual output (growth) volatility (treated volatility/control 
volatility) calculated from the resulting quarterly observations, diff_output (diff_growth) is the difference 
in annualized output (growth) between treated and control countries.14 The dummy variable is zero before 
2014 and 1 after 2014. We expect 𝛽1and 𝛽2 to be positive suggesting that the treated countries showed 
significantly more volatility than the control post 2014 with respect to output and growth. We also expect 
                                                          
13 Since we place less emphasis on the fit of the level of the synthetic control and more on the volatility and growth 
differential, the corresponding graphs for the synthetic and treated countries are not as informative and as such are not 
reported here but are available upon request from the authors.  
14 The annual output (growth) volatility data is generated by computing the standard deviation of quarterly output 
(growth) in a given year. The growth rate of GDP is calculated as the first difference of natural logs of output. Note 
that the difference measure discussed here is always treated observations – synthetic control observations. 
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𝛽3 and 𝛽4 to be negative suggesting that the treated countries had significantly lower output and growth 
post 2014 than their synthetic control.15  
Table 3 captures the results from equations (3) to (6) above. Columns 1 to 4 show positive and 
significant coefficients as expected suggesting that the synthetic controls had less volatility due to their 
financial depth compared to their treated counterparts and this manifested as higher volatility in both growth 
and output post 2014. When we exclude the two countries (Cameroon and Indonesia) with oil-to-GDP ratios 
less than 10%, we observe that the coefficients are larger, giving credence to the idea that the ability of the 
financial sector to mitigate the negative effects depends on the degree of dependence.16  
While a majority of the differences in output and growth are negative as was expected, none of 
them are significant. A possible explanation is that by 2016, the uptick in oil prices may have offset some 
of the negative effects observed in the 2014/2015 period. This effect should be especially pronounced with 
respect to the growth rate measures since a lower base value of GDP would exaggerate any increase in 
subsequent growth. To address this issue, the same regressions are estimated excluding 2016 and the results 
are summarized in Table 4. Concentrating on 2014 and 2015 only, we see negative and significant 
differences in output and growth in the post treatment period supporting the point above regarding the 2016 
uptick in oil prices. Also, note that the results for growth are even stronger as expected per discussion above. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here] 
 
3.1 Placebo Tests 
Following the tradition in counterfactual methodologies, we perform placebo tests as a measure of 
robustness. To do this, we assume that the control countries with superior financial development measures 
actually have subpar financial measures and re-run the same analysis, one control country at a time. Each 
time a control country is being “treated”, it is removed from the control set.17  
As hypothesized, the RMSPE in the placebo test is 0.133, slightly less than half of the RMSPE in 
the treatment group (0.299). This resulting better fit highlights the importance of the contribution of 
financial depth to output. The second and main point of the placebo tests is to determine if the effect found 
in the treated tests still persists when treated and synthetic controls have similar financial depth measures. 
According to our hypothesis, we should expect no discernable difference in any of our variables before and 
                                                          
15 The smaller the difference in output or growth (less positive or more negative), the worse off the treated country is 
compared to the synthetic control 
16 This point will be formalized with the case study of Nigeria, see Section 3.2. 
17 This is in contrast to the methodology suggested by AG. AG uses the idea that if there is no real difference, the 
treated countries should also be introduced in the “bucket” of control countries used in forming synthetic controls for 
the placebo tests. Our approach takes things a step further and proves that this need not be done to show that the effect 
among financially deep countries is negligible. This suggests an even stronger repudiation of arguments against our 
findings compared to the standard approach by AG. 
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after the reduction in oil price. In terms of the econometric model adopted in equations 3 to 6 above, we 
expect much smaller and potentially insignificant coefficients 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 when compared to the same 
estimates in Tables 3 and 4 above.  
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here] 
 
To this end Table 5 replicates Table 3, from which we can see that the coefficients are far smaller 
and less significant than in Table 3, thus supporting our main hypothesis that it is indeed the differences in 
financial depth that account for the differences in Table 3 between the pre and post 2014 periods. Columns 
5 to 8 in Table 5 report the results for those control countries that have much better fits,18 being in line with 
the results from columns 1 to 4.  Table 6 replicates the findings in Table 4 for the placebo tests as well. We 
see that one again, unlike Table 4, all coefficients are far smaller and statistically insignificant; suggesting 
that the effect of better financial depth is what is driving the results.  
 
3.2     Nigeria the Oddity: Dependence Matters 
In this section, which speaks more to the natural resource curse literature, we use the unique circumstances 
surrounding Nigeria’s GDP as an experiment within an experiment to investigate the impact of oil 
dependence on the ability of the financial sector to mitigate the negative effects of oil price volatility. The 
premise is simple, Nigeria re-based its GDP measure in 2013 which saw its output grow by about 89% in 
one year. This revision took the non-oil sectors (mainly telecoms, manufacturing and the prolific 
entertainment industries) more prominently into account implying a lower dependence on oil in the post-
2014 period compared to its pre-treatment period.19 We stipulate that, if the degree of dependence does not 
matter, we would expect to see similar results in Nigeria as we have encountered in the treated countries 
above, where the post-2014 trend indicated higher comparative volatility (i.e. compared to their 
corresponding synthetic control). However, if dependence matters, we would see that Nigeria (the treatment 
country) is more volatile in the pre-2014 period than its financially advanced counterfactual and is less so 
when the degree of dependence on oil is reduced post 2014 after it’s GDP has been rebased (despite the 
negative price shock and the synthetic control having greater financial depth, both of which should have 
implied even higher volatility for Nigeria post 2014).  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
                                                          
18 These regressions exclude countries for which the nested option on Stata for synth estimation could not be used, 
resulting in much less precise fits. 
19 See Nigeria’s GDP Step Change in The Economist (April 12, 2014). https://www.economist.com/news/finance-
and-economics/21600734-revised-figures-show-nigeria-africas-largest-economy-step-change 
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Table 7 highlights pre and post-2014 volatility measures as well as output and growth levels for 
Nigeria. From Table 7, we see that both output and growth volatility for Nigeria in the pre-2014 period was 
much higher when oil revenues made up a higher percentage of their GDP. In the post 2014 era however, 
we see that there is no difference in output volatility and an even smaller growth volatility when compared 
to its synthetic counterfactual. We find no discernable difference in average growth rates as all differences 
are insignificant but with respect to output, we see no difference in average output in the pre-2014 period20, 
while the post 2014 period shows that Nigeria had higher average output levels when compared with the 
synthetic control, reflecting the reduced role of oil revenues in GDP. This strongly suggests that the ability 
of a country’s financial sector to mitigate the negative effects of oil price volatility is positively correlated 
with the degree of dependence on oil, and as such, higher degrees of dependence on oil should be 
accompanied by higher financial depth. 
 
4. Accounting for Potential Endogeneities: The Panel CS-ARDL Model 
The results in Section 3 point to a significant effect of financial depth in mitigating oil price volatility, 
ultimately leading to higher levels of output and growth. While the nature of our measure of finance and 
the long term time horizon of our study reduce the chances of endogeneities, as we extensively discussed 
in the introduction, nonetheless, to address remaining concerns about the endogeneity between oil prices 
and finance (e.g. Zhang, 2017), we re-examine our earlier findings by using the cross-sectionally augmented 
autoregressive distributed lag (CS-ARDL) model. 21 We also use this opportunity to extend the scope of our 
analysis to include more countries over a longer period of time. We are thus able to focus on four significant 
(and unusually large) drop in oil prices between 1980 and 2016, particularly 1986, 1998, 2009 and 2015. 
 
4.1  Methodology and Estimation Procedure  
In an analysis such as this where institutional variables are involved, a high degree of persistence in the 
level of these measures is to be expected, rendering analyses that depend on taking a first difference or 
demeaning less than appropriate. An alternative would be to take five-year averages as is commonly done, 
but doing so eliminates some variation in other variables of interest such as the growth rate of oil prices and 
its volatility. The CS-ARDL approach allows us to study the long-run effects of these persistent institutional 
variables in conjunction with the evolution of the more erratic behavior of oil prices using annual data. 
Moreover, in a series of papers, Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
                                                          
20 This is to be expected given the way in which the counterfactual was created. 
21 While this method is capable of addressing potential endogeneity issues, the drawback of this approach is the loss 
of sub annual data points for which to calculate annual output and growth volatility. As a result, this approach focuses 
on the eventual effects of financial mitigation on growth, given historic oil price volatility.  
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show that the traditional ARDL approach can not only be used for long-run analysis, but that it is also valid 
regardless of whether the regressors are exogenous or endogenous, and whether the underlying variables 
are I(0) or I(1).  These features of the panel ARDL approach are appealing in dealing with endogeneity 
issues. Furthermore, by employing a panel CS-ARDL model, we take into account cross-sectional 
dependencies in errors due to possible global factors (including the stance of global financial cycle) and/or 
spillover effects from one country to another which tend to magnify at times of financial crises.22 We 
therefore estimate the following equation:  
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑙∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=0 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=0 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + ∑ 𝛿𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=0 𝑦𝑡−𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=0 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,      (7) 
 
 
where, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita, ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the growth rate of real GDP per capita, 
and 𝑦?̅?   is the cross-sectional average of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 at time t, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the growth rate of real oil prices (∆𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡), and 
𝑤𝑖𝑡  represents oil price volatility, driven by large price drops. To create this variable we interact realized 
real oil price growth volatility for year t, 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑡, constructed as the standard deviation of the year-on-year 
growth rates of the natural logarithm of monthly real oil prices, 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖𝜏 during months τ = 1,…,12 in year t, 
with a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during years of significant oil price drops and 0 
otherwise. Therefore, in contrast to most studies in the growth literature, which employ time-invariant 
measures of volatility, we are able to construct a time-varying measure of oil price volatility. Finally, 𝒛𝑖𝑡 is 
a vector representing the interaction of the above measure (𝑤𝑖𝑡) with the financial variables of interest, i.e. 
the financial components of the Fraser chain linked index of institutional quality explained in detail in 
Section 2.3. A comparison of models, one with estimates of 𝑤𝑖𝑡 but without 𝒛𝑖𝑡 and another with 𝒛𝑖𝑡  but 
without 𝑤𝑖𝑡 should provide evidence of the effect of the financial depth.
23 Comparing the coefficients of 
𝑤𝑖𝑡 and 𝒛𝑖𝑡 , 𝑤e expect the coefficients of 𝒛𝑖𝑡 to be smaller so as to illustrate the effect of financial depth in 
mitigating the effects of negative oil price growth volatility 
 
4.2 Data 
We begin with an annual dataset comprised of 194 countries between 1980 and 2016. Note that we must 
allow for enough lags, p, such the residuals of the error-correction model are serially uncorrelated but not 
too many lags so that it imposes excessive parameter requirements on the data, i.e. allowing for enough 
degrees of freedom. Mohaddes and Raissi (2017) suggest capping the lags at 3 and this is the approach that 
                                                          
22 See Chudik and Pesaran (2015) for details on cross-sectional adjustment.  
23 Since the only difference between these two specifications is the introduction of finance in the second interaction 
term 𝒛𝑖𝑡. 
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we take. However, to allow for enough lags, sufficient time series observations for each country is needed, 
we therefore require each country to have at least 25 consecutive observations on 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡, 𝑤𝑖𝑡   and 𝒛𝑖𝑡.
24  
 Because of missing observations for some of the countries in case of the institutional variables,25 
our sample is reduced to 62 countries. Moreover, since we are interested in countries that produce oil, we 
calculate the average of oil-value-to-GDP ratio for all countries in our dataset over a 30-year period and 
select only countries above the 50th percentile (which is a cutoff that includes countries that have at least an 
oil value to GDP of 0.09%). What remains is a sample of 30 oil producers with T greater than 25. Table 11 
in the Appendix provides a list of the 30 countries, as well as their average financial measures and the ratio 
of oil value to GDP. 
 
4.3  The Role of Financial Institutions 
Commodity prices are never entirely predictable and oil prices are no exception. However, moderate price 
fluctuations can be “expected” as the outcome of forecasting models within reasonable confidence bands 
and internalized by agents’ behavior as for example in firms’ and investors’ hedging strategies.  Large 
shocks that deviate greatly from historical means, however, are often unexpected and this is where we 
would expect stronger financial institutions to better mitigate the resulting effects.  The analogy to bank’s 
expected and unexpected loan default rates illustrates this point: expected loan defaults, those within certain 
standard deviation of the mean of the probability distribution of default, are considered idiosyncratic risks 
and allowed for in the loan reserves. However, unexpected defaults, i.e., those exceeding a pre-determined 
standard deviation from the mean, are considered part of systemic risk and only addressed by banks’ capital 
requirements. Under severe downturns as in 2008, banks with low capital were unable to survive the 
massive effect of default.  Now consider Figure 2 below that shows oil price growth between 1980 and 
2016. If we define unexpected shocks as those “out of the norm” when oil price shocks are greater than one 
standard deviation from the mean, we arrive at the “unexpected oil shocks” in 1986, 1998, 2009 and 2015.26 
The fact that this approach includes the most recent large oil price drop provide us with a robustness check 
on the validity of SCM method which also focused on the same period.  But since we are now also able to 
include other periods of large price drop here, our approach in this section goes beyond a robustness check 
and actually generalizes the hypothesis of the mitigating role of finance to any period where such a shock 
is experienced.  
                                                          
24 Chudik et al. (2017) and Mohaddes and Raissi (2017) suggest the minimum T to be around 25 for each i. 
25 While we have annual data on domestic financial institutions from 2000 onward, the data between 1970 and 2000 
is reported at five year intervals only. However, since institutional variables change only very gradually over time, we 
obtain annual series for these variables from 1970-2014 by linearly interpolating each institutional variable on a 
country-by- country basis. 
26 There are also periods that show positive oil price shocks, but we will only focus on the negative unexpected shocks 
as this is where we believe mitigation of financial institutions is most evident. 
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Figure 2: Oil Price Growth, 1980 – 2016 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on data from US Department of Energy and OPEC. 
 
4.4  Results 
Estimating equation (7) we present the long-run coefficients of the CS-ARDL regressions in Tables 8, 
where the first three columns indicate that GDP growth is impacted positively and significantly by oil price 
growth and negatively and significantly by the oil price growth volatility in all three lag specifications. This 
provides support for the hypothesis that it is not the abundance, but the price volatility of oil that acts to 
retard long-run growth prospects. The question then is whether financial institutions can dampen this 
volatility effect? Columns 4 to 9 of table 8 presents the results of this analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
As the first step, columns 4 to 6 introduce the measure of “negative oil shocks” which we have 
denoted as 𝒘𝑖𝑡 in equation (7). This measure is constructed by the interaction of oil price growth volatility 
with a dummy variable which takes the value of 1, when oil price growth is negative beyond one standard 
deviation of the mean, and 0 otherwise, signifying unexpected negative oil price shocks. We see first and 
foremost that the magnitude of the coefficient of negative oil shocks is about two and half times larger than 
that of oil price growth volatility in columns 1 through 3. This suggests that much of the negative effect of 
volatility arises from these large (and therefore likely unexpected) shocks, and that the “positive shocks” 
may have cushioned the overall effect of volatility, given the smaller coefficients in columns 1-3.  
Our key results are shown in columns 7-9 of Table 8. Here, we examine the mitigating property of 
financial institutions in the face of large drops in oil prices. To do this, we interact the financial institutions 
index with our measure of negative oil shocks. Comparing columns 4-6 to columns 7-9, the strong 
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mitigating role of financial depth in cushioning the effect of the negative oil shock is self-evident: the 
coefficients of “Finance” when interacted with “Negative Oil Shocks” in columns 7-9, although still 
negative, are far less than the negative effects of the corresponding coefficients of oil shock but without 
finance, about one tenth of the latter (i.e., -5.009 vs -0.309; -8.625 vs -0.893; -11.04 vs -0.868). This points 
to the benefits of strong financial institutions.  Notice also that in columns 7-9 the coefficient of “Finance” 
itself is highly significant and positive.  This reinforces the fact that the negative coefficient of the 
interaction term, comes entirely from the adverse effect of negative oil shock, not financial institutions. The 
mitigating effect of financial institutions in the presence of unexpected negative shocks echoes our finding 
of Section 3, where we used the SCM method. In the end however, finance can only cushion the blow, but 
not reverse it.27 
5. Energy Security and Financial Institutions 
Our counterfactual exercise has so far highlighted the importance of finance in dampening the negative 
effect of oil price volatility on economic growth, however, our results also have implications in terms of 
energy security and its impact on development. Although we take a supply-side approach by studying the 
impact of oil price volatility on oil producers, our results certainly have implications for the net oil importers 
as well. The latter have often been the principal focus when discussing energy security which, by definition, 
is polysemic and can be viewed in different ways depending on the focus of the study (Chester, 2010 and 
Vivoda, 2010). In this section, we highlight some of the pathways through which our findings in this paper 
connect to and address some of the problems associated with energy security. Ang et al. (2015), in their 
extensive review of publications on energy security, classify energy security concerns into seven main 
themes: energy availability, infrastructure, energy prices, societal effects, environment, governance, and 
energy efficiency. Of these seven themes, we focus on energy availability and energy prices, which 99% 
and 71% of publications are concerned with respectively, placing these two in the top three of concerns 
when examining energy security.28  
 In general, energy availability is an energy security concern when one focuses on import disruptions 
from wars, destabilized regimes, destruction of energy transportation facilities, strikes, and sanctions to 
                                                          
27 In an earlier version of this paper, we verify that the individual components of our finance measure all mitigate the 
impact of negative oil shocks, with the strongest mitigation effect (measured by the degree of reduction in the size of 
the negative coefficient) belonging to the ownership of banks measure, followed by the interest rate control and private 
sector credit (see Jarrett et al, 2018). We also take advantage of the composite nature of the Fraser chain linked index 
to separate the effect of financial institutions from overall institutional measures and we find that it is the financial 
measure that is the driving force behind the mitigating effect of the overall variable. Results of these regressions are 
not reported but are available from the authors upon request. 
28 Infrastructure which deals with the state of facilities which include energy transformation and distribution 
facilities make up 72% of publication making it the second most important concern, see Ang et al. (2015). 
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name but a few. In addition to this, we posit that import disruptions can also be due to the quantity 
adjustment mechanism employed by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) over 
the last several decades and more recently by OPEC+. It has long been argued, dating back to the first oil 
crisis of 1973/74, that major oil exporters that heavily depend on oil revenues, set their oil production to 
achieve a given level of oil revenues, the so-called target revenue model; see, for instance, Bénard (1980), 
Crémer and Salehi-Isfahani (1980), and Teece (1982).29 The objective of OPEC, while attempting to 
stabilize the revenue streams for major oil producing countries, clearly has consequences for oil importers. 
For example, as we have seen recently, following the US shale oil revolution and the sharp fall in oil prices 
in 2014, OPEC+ agreed to reduce global oil supply, which in turn played a large role in increasing oil prices 
by 50% over the last 12 months (also having additional implications for affordability, another dimension 
of energy security). Given our findings, better financial management of oil price volatility will mean 
reduced reliance on the quantity adjustment mechanism, which would in turn, imply a more reliable flow 
of oil and thus improved energy security for all without compromising economic growth. Note that this will 
indirectly also address the affordability dimension of energy security as we should see fewer sharp increases 
in oil prices. The stabilizing effect of better finances on macroeconomic measures (particularly GDP) has 
the potential to increase energy trade, diversification, and availability and thus overall energy security, 
through reduction in overall risk.30 
 Now turning our attention to energy prices as an energy security concern, three aspects stand out: 
absolute price level, price volatility and the degree of competition (Ang et al., 2015). Better financial 
institutions lead to more efficient allocation of capital resources which in turn provides better technology 
geared towards cheaper extraction of oil, ultimately leading to lower price levels and increasing competition 
by increasing the number of energy suppliers (for example fracking in North America).31 Another aspect of 
energy security concerns through energy prices is exchange rate fluctuation, which could increase 
uncertainty given that oil is traded in US dollars, and potentially impact the ability of a net-importer to 
purchase oil (Ang et al., 2015). Given the well-established relationship between output and exchange rates, 
the stabilization effect of better finances translates to more stable exchange rates, reducing the associated 
uncertainty leading to better energy security. Finally, given the results of better mitigation of uncertainty 
on the supply side, during periods of extreme negative price dips, it is not unreasonable to expect similar 
                                                          
29 See also Mohaddes (2013) for a short review of the role of OPEC in influencing the oil markets. 
30 The link between lower risk and increase in trade at large has been shown in a recent paper by Jarrett and Mohtadi 
(2018). 
31 For the role of finance in technological innovation see Laeven et al. (2015). As the US case suggests, such 
technological innovation may even have a transforming effect, leading from net importer status to net exporter status, 
if properly harnessed.  
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mitigating effects of finance on the demand side during extreme price spikes, thus promoting energy 
security in countries that are most reliant on it.  
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this paper we have offered a quasi-natural experiment to study the mitigating role of financial depth in 
the impact of oil price volatility on growth. We investigated this proposition first using a synthetic control 
(counterfactual) method to capture the degree to which financial depth mitigates the negative effects of oil 
volatility, and then correct for any possible remaining endogeneity issues using panel CS-ARDL 
regressions thereby, taking into account all three key features of the panel: dynamics, heterogeneity and 
cross-sectional dependence, a methodological contribution in and of itself. 
 The counterfactual exercise provided support to the idea that financial depth does indeed mitigate 
the negative effects oil price volatility and therefore increases energy security. This is evidenced by the fact 
that the counterfactuals which posit an alternative scenario, where treated countries have higher financial 
depth measures, showed a significant decrease in output volatility and higher growth rates in 2015.  We 
also found evidence which suggests that better financial depth is required as the degree of dependence on 
oil increases. Finally, to insure that any possible endogeneity is not the source of our findings, we verified 
these results using the CS-ARDL approach and data on 30 oil-producing countries over three decades 
(1980-2016). More specifically, we illustrated the critical role of financial institutions especially during 
periods of unexpectedly large negative oil price shocks. In all cases, we also found direct positive 
contribution of financial depth to growth. 
 The policy solution we have outlined, i.e., better financial institutions, has a bearing not only for 
the better management of the impact of this volatility for oil producers, such as those in the Middle East 
and North Africa region as well as the Asian countries ramping up commodity production especially those 
in our sample (Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand), but also critically for its 
implications for improved global energy security for this vital resource.  Evidence suggests that better 
financial institutions improve macroeconomic stability and decrease reliance on quantity adjustment 
mechanisms in oil exporting countries, while simultaneously reducing both oil price volatility and oil price 
levels. These address the issues of availability and energy prices, which are important concerns in 
establishing energy security, without compromising economic growth. In general, the flexibility of a freer 
financial system allows for faster market adaptation to oil and commodity price fluctuations leading to 
better allocation of capital and more steady growth. 
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Table 1: Optimal Weights of Potential Control Countries 
 
Brunei Kuwait Oman Qatar Kazakhstan Malaysia Mexico Norway Trinidad 
Algeria 0 0 0 0.266 0.628 0.009 0 0.097 0 
Angola 0 0 0 0.039 0.267 0 0 0.693 0 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0.244 0 0 0 0.756 0 
Cameroon 0 0 0 0.833 0 0 0 0.167 0 
Congo$ 0 0 0 0.376 0 0 0 0.624 0 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0.438 0 0.124 0 0.439 0 
Gabon$ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0.304 0 0.696 0 0 0 
Iran. 0 0.401 0 0.012 0 0.587 0 0 0 
Russia$ 0 0 0 0.008 0 0.992 0 0 0 
UAE 0.457 0 0 0 0.133 0.409 0 0 0.457 
 
Notes: Each ijth cell is the weight assigned to the potential control country j in creating the synthetic control for the treated country i. Numbers 
sum up horizontally to 1. Each row is therefore the resulting optimal weight vector W* for each treated country i. $ represents countries estimated 
differently as the resulting Hessian matrix during the minimization process (nested option on stata) was asymmetric and could not be inverted. 
The non-nested option in stata was thus used to generate the counterfactual for these countries which resulted in one country matches. 
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Table 2: Predictor Variable Comparison 
 
Algeria Angola Azerbaijan Cameroon Congo$ Ecuador 
 TC SC TC SC TC SC TC SC TC SC TC SC 
Capital Stock 14.11 13.77 13.30 12.76 11.49 12.46 11.65 13.11 11.03 12.61 13.06 13.10 
Imports 23.01 23.66 22.20 22.18 21.33 21.65 20.92 22.42 20.64 21.82 22.29 22.40 
Exports 23.47 24.07 23.22 22.82 22.20 22.45 20.84 23.22 21.55 22.62 22.24 23.09 
Trade to GDP 0.69 1.35 1.09 1.15 0.84 0.93 0.46 0.82 1.37 0.90 0.61 0.85 
GDP 2006: Q1 23.80 23.71 22.54 22.63 21.54 22.28 21.94 22.90 20.34 22.42 22.96 23.02 
Oil Value 0.17 0.13 0.47 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.09 0.22 0.47 0.19 0.14 0.19 
Ka_open 0.16 0.35 0.02 0.79 0.36 0.80 0.16 0.30 0.16 0.69 0.77 0.60 
Population  17.40 16.72 16.86 15.00 16.02 14.71 16.83 16.19 15.21 15.04 16.51 15.77 
SWF 2014:Q3 1.52 2.16 0.33 1.01 4.05 2.30 0.00 5.68 0.00 3.06 0.00 3.31  
Gabon$ Indonesia Iran Russia$ UAE  
 TC SC TC SC TC SC TC SC TC SC   
Capital Stock 11.16 12.20 16.16 14.86 14.97 14.42 15.69 15.52 14.44 14.09   
Imports 20.46 21.32 24.16 24.40 23.51 24.02 24.77 25.15 24.60 23.83   
Exports 21.33 22.13 24.33 24.57 23.88 24.19 25.34 25.04 24.56 24.30   
Trade to GDP 0.88 0.97 0.51 0.66 0.47 0.78 0.50 0.61 1.54 0.90   
GDP 2006: Q1 21.15 22.02 24.69 25.21 24.45 24.73 25.42 26.12 24.78 24.63   
Oil Value 0.38 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.23 0.22   
Ka_open 0.16 1.00 0.58 0.54 0.40 0.81 0.54 0.69 1.00 0.65   
Population  14.24 14.10 19.30 17.98 18.12 17.10 18.78 18.57 15.84 16.70   
SWF 2014:Q3 0.10 0.90 0.00 2.03 0.48 0.57 0.52 0.07 11.92 7.19   
 
Notes: The table shows the average estimates of the predictor variables used to determine the optimal weights required to create the 
counterfactuals for each treated country. The average of all variables for each treated country is reported as well as the average for its 
corresponding synthetic control. TC represents the data for the treated country and SC represents the data for its corresponding synthetic 
control. $ represents countries estimated differently as the resulting Hessian matrix during the minimization process (nested option on 
stata) was asymmetric and could not be inverted. The non-nested option in stata was thus used to generate the counterfactual for these 
countries which resulted in one country matches. 
 27 
 
Table 3: Annualized Regressions with Post-Treatment Years 2014, 2015 and 2016 
 All treated countries Treated countries with >10% oil-to-GDP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Output Volatility Ratio 
Oil price  1.486** 2.291** 1.486** 2.291** 1.777** 2.736** 1.777** 2.736** 
decline (0.636) (1.013) (0.664) (1.062) (0.747) (1.203) (0.780) (1.262) 
  
 Growth Volatility Ratio 
Oil price  1.503* 3.303** 1.503* 3.303** 1.767* 3.860** 1.767* 3.860** 
decline (0.796) (1.385) (0.832) (1.452) (0.953) (1.646) (0.995) (1.727) 
         
 Differences in Output 
Oil price  -0.0128 -0.134 -0.0128 -0.134 0.0138 -0.0941 0.0138 -0.0941 
decline (0.114) (0.171) (0.119) (0.180) (0.122) (0.184) (0.128) (0.193) 
         
Countries 11 11 11 11 9 9 9 9 
Observations 121 121 121 121 99 99 99 99 
 Differences in Growth 
Oil price  -0.111 -0.0350 -0.111 -0.0350 -0.0894 0.00370 -0.0894 0.00370 
decline (0.0788) (0.177) (0.0827) (0.186) (0.0862) (0.193) (0.0904) (0.203) 
         
Countries 11 11 11 11 9 9 9 9 
Observations 110 110 110 110 90 90 90 90 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes: *,**,*** represent levels of significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Oil price decline is a dummy variable 
that represents the cutoff point when the treatment takes place: 0 if before oil price decline and 1 after oil price decline. Output 
(growth) volatility ratio is annual output (growth) volatility of the treated country divided by the output (growth) volatility of the 
corresponding synthetic control. For these two measures, a positive estimate suggests that post oil price decline, the treated countries 
show more volatility than their counterfactual with better financial depth measures (from 0 to 1, ratio increases). Differences in 
output (growth) is the output (growth) of the treated country minus the output (growth) of the synthetic control. For these measures, 
a negative estimate suggests that as we move from pre to post oil price decline, output (growth) is lower in the treated country than 
in their synthetic control suggesting better performance for countries with better financial depth measures (from 0 to 1, the 
difference gets smaller).  
 
 
Table 4: Annualized Regressions with Post-Treatment Years 2014 and 2015 
 All treated countries Treated countries with >10% oil-to-GDP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Differences in Output 
Oil price  -0.0151 -0.139*** -0.0151 -0.139*** -0.00452 -0.131** -0.00452 -0.131** 
decline (0.0613) (0.0485) (0.0643) (0.0512) (0.0707) (0.0573) (0.0742) (0.0604) 
         
Countries 11 11 11 11 9 9 9 9 
Observations 110 110 110 110 90 90 90 90 
  
Differences in Growth 
Oil price  -0.183*** -0.179*** -0.183*** -0.179*** -0.173*** -0.164** -0.173*** -0.164** 
decline (0.0508) (0.0651) (0.0537) (0.0691) (0.0616) (0.0719) (0.0649) (0.0762) 
         
Countries 11 11 11 11 9 9 9 9 
Observations 99 99 99 99 81 81 81 81 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes: See Table 3. 
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Table 5: Annualized Regressions with Post-Treatment Years being 2014, 2015 and 2016 (placebo) 
 All control countries Control countries with better fits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Output Volatility Ratio 
Oil price  0.417* 0.245 0.417 0.245 0.530* 0.415 0.530* 0.415 
decline (0.247) (0.513) (0.258) (0.538) (0.300) (0.655) (0.313) (0.687) 
         
 Growth Volatility Ratio 
Oil price  0.430 1.185 0.430 1.185 -0.0251 0.340 -0.0251 0.340 
decline (0.660) (1.071) (0.689) (1.124) (0.705) (0.979) (0.735) (1.027) 
         
 Differences in Output 
Oil price  0.0321 0.0685 0.0321 0.0685 0.0333 0.165 0.0333 0.165 
decline (0.108) (0.146) (0.113) (0.154) (0.118) (0.173) (0.123) (0.181) 
         
Countries 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 
Observations 99 99 99 99 77 77 77 77 
 Differences in Growth 
Oil price  0.0339 0.0807 0.0339 0.0807 0.0866 0.209 0.0866 0.209 
decline (0.0682) (0.244) (0.0716) (0.257) (0.076) (0.302) (0.0791) (0.318) 
         
Countries 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 
Observations 90 90 90 90 70 70 70 70 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes: See Table 3 but note that columns 5 to 8 in this table excludes control countries with poor fits. 
 
Table 6: Annualized Regressions with Post-Treatment Years being 2014 and 2015 (placebo) 
 All control countries Control countries with better fits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Differences in Output 
Oil price  -0.00448 -0.0046 -0.00448 -0.0046 -0.0554 -0.0119 -0.0554 -0.0119 
decline (0.162) (0.142) (0.170) (0.150) (0.193) (0.189) (0.203) (0.200) 
         
Countries 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 
Observations 90 90 90 90 70 70 70 70 
 Differences in Growth 
Oil price  -0.00493 0.00298 -0.00493 0.00298 -0.00799 0.0200 -0.00799 0.0200 
decline (0.136) (0.157) (0.144) (0.166) (0.178) (0.207) (0.187) (0.219) 
         
Countries 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 
Observations 81 81 81 81 63 63 63 63 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes: See Table 3 but note that columns 5 to 8 in this table excludes control countries with poor fits. 
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Table 7: Results from the Special Case of Nigeria 
 Pre 2014: Q3 Post 2014: Q3 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
TC SC TC/SC TC SC TC/SC 
Output volatility 0.55 0.18 3.06*** 0.11 0.11 1.00 
Growth Volatility 0.19 0.14 1.38** 0.08 0.14 0.57* 
 
TC SC TC-SC TC SC TC-SC 
Average Output level  24.85 24.86 -0.01 25.57 25.1 0.47*** 
Average Growth level 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.01 
Notes: *,**,*** represent levels of significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively TC 
is treated country and SC is the corresponding synthetic control 
 
 
Table 8: CS-ARDL using PMG: Baseline, Domestic Financial measures and Isolating Unexpected 
Negative Shocks  
 Growth Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Oil price 2.398*** 1.314* 3.469*** 1.283* -1.424* -1.469 1.358** -0.648 -0.537 
Growth (0.575) (0.728) (0.971) (0.672) (0.765) (0.943) (0.654) (0.793) (1.010) 
          
Oil price -2.161** -3.71*** -4.86***       
Growth Volatility (0.984) (1.088) (1.445)       
          
Negative Oil Shocks    -5.009*** -8.625*** -11.04***    
    (1.708) (1.664) (2.080)    
          
Negative Oil Shocks ×       -0.309 -0.893*** -0.868*** 
Finance        (0.200) (0.230) (0.295) 
          
Finance       0.546*** 0.763*** 0.513*** 
       (0.134) (0.120) (0.114) 
          
Error correction -0.76*** -0.81*** -0.75*** -0.745*** -0.815*** -0.794*** -0.773*** -0.837*** -0.880*** 
 (0.0457) (0.0585) (0.0690) (0.0452) (0.0571) (0.0677) (0.0438) (0.0613) (0.0747) 
Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Observations 990 960 930 960 930 900 990 960 930 
Notes: Regressions are run using the pooled mean group estimator. The ARDL is cross sectionally adjusted using average output, but this 
variable is not reported. Standard errors in parentheses with *,** and *** representing significance at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence 
intervals. Columns 1, 4, and 7 represent an empirical model specification of one lag; columns 2, 5, and 8 have two lags and columns 3, 6, 
and 9 have three lags. Short-run estimates were included but not reported. Finance is the aggregate measure of financial institutions used in this 
analysis, which is a combination of bank ownership measures, private sector credit and interest rate controls. Negative oil shocks are constructed by the 
interaction of oil price growth volatility with a dummy variable which takes the value of 1, when oil price growth is negative beyond one standard deviation 
of the mean, and 0 otherwise, signifying unexpected negative oil price shocks. Comparing columns 4-6 to columns 7-9, the mitigating role of financial depth 
in cushioning the effect of the negative oil shock is quite evident: The coefficient of Negative Oil Shocks × Finance  although still negative, is less than one 
tenth the of the negative effect of oil shock without finance. This suggests the benefit of strong financial institutions. A version of this table where the level 
of finance was introduced to columns 4-6 still showed significant reductions in coefficients of the interaction terms suggesting the reduction stems primarily 
from the interaction between finance and oil price volatility as opposed to just the level of financial depth. Results of this analysis are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Appendix 
Table 9: Data Sources 
Variables Sources 
Ownership of banks Fraser chain linked index data set 
Private sector credit Fraser chain linked index data set 
Interest rate controls negative Fraser chain linked index data set 
Population Penn World Tables 
Government Consumption Fraser chain linked index data set 
Transfers and subsidies Fraser chain linked index data set 
Judicial independence Fraser chain linked index data set 
Impartial courts Fraser chain linked index data set 
Fraser chain linked Summary Index Fraser chain linked index data set 
Total assets and Liabilities IMF International Financial Statistics Database 
Seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP (for measure 
verification) 
OECD Statistical database 
GDP World Bank World Development Indicator Database 
Capital stock at constant 2011 national prices (in 
mil. 2011US$) 
Penn World Tables 
Chinn-Ito Dejure measure of financial openness http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm 
Oil value to GDP ratio Oil and Gas data Ross(2013) 
http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlross 
Trade to GDP ratio World Bank World Development Indicator Database 
Import to GDP ratio World Bank World Development Indicator Database 
Oil Price United States department of energy via quandl.com and 
OPEC (opec.org) 
Exports IMF International Financial Statistics Database 
Imports IMF International Financial Statistics Database 
Sovereign wealth funds Sovereign wealth funds Institute 
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Table 10: List of Control and Treated Countries 
Treated Countries % of oil value to GDP Control countries % of oil value to GDP 
Angola 59.40% Brunei Darussalam 33.20% 
Azerbaijan 43.70% Kuwait 48.20% 
Congo, Rep. 59.40% Oman 44.30% 
Gabon 45.60% Qatar 37.80% 
Algeria 18.50% Kazakhstan 25.30% 
Cameroon 9.80% Malaysia 8.50% 
Ecuador 15.50% Mexico 8.30% 
Indonesia 9.10% Norway 12.40% 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 24.90% Trinidad and Tobago 19.10% 
Russian Federation 16.50% 
  
United Arab Emirates 26.01% 
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Table 11: List of Countries in the CS-ARDL Sample 
Country Finance Measure percent oil value of GDP 
Argentina 6.90 4.37% 
Australia 9.63 1.48% 
Austria 9.03 0.16% 
Benin 8.50 1.40% 
Brazil 5.98 1.79% 
Canada 9.84 3.44% 
Chile 9.01 0.51% 
Denmark 9.77 1.26% 
Ecuador 8.00 15.46% 
Egypt 6.04 14.42% 
Ghana 6.79 0.48% 
Greece 6.84 0.12% 
Guatemala 8.93 0.74% 
Hungary 7.98 0.82% 
India 6.62 1.52% 
Indonesia 7.33 9.13% 
Iran 4.78 24.89% 
Malaysia 8.60 8.48% 
Mexico 8.37 8.29% 
Netherlands 9.48 0.14% 
New Zealand 9.44 0.57% 
Norway 9.49 12.38% 
Pakistan 7.29 0.75% 
Philippines 8.75 0.20% 
Thailand 8.70 0.78% 
Tunisia 7.47 6.32% 
Turkey 6.63 0.37% 
United Kingdom 8.84 1.64% 
United States 9.14 1.19% 
Venezuela 7.56 28.52% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
